blog6.txt Hall and Wayman, "Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees" APSR, 1. What previous research results inspire Hall and Wayman's project? What past explanations for the lack of PAC influence do they want to question? What is the puzzle of the "rational PAC"? 2. If you want to find interest group influence in the US Congress, which part should you study? If there is PAC influence, what properties should it have? Refer to "mobilization" and "de-mobilization" hypotheses. 3. What are the 3 laws considered in the data for this study? The authors claim that they have some especially powerful evidence with these particular cases. DO you see why? 4. What evidence for the impact of PACS does this study offer? Are there ways to quibble with this result? (I don't know for sure, but I'm just wondering what you think) When are PAC influences strongest? When are they weakest? In memory of Bill Browne. Professor Browne was a student of Professor Robert Salisbury, about 15 years before I was. His life was tragically cut short by leukemia, from which he recently passed away after a long struggle. He published many interesting books and articles. I've chosen these two because they are my favorites. "Organized Interests and their Issue Niches", Alexander's Chapter 19. It was originally published in the Journal of Politics, one of the finest 3 journals in political science, in 1990. 1. Remember the beginning of the semester when we talked about "pluralism"? We need to make sure everybody understands the debate they had with the so-called "elite theorists". Browne describes his project as a "search for pluralism." Do you understand what he is looking for? 2. When they lobby, would you say organizations focus on the "big picture" or on "small items"? By "big picture" I mean the "integrative" or domain-wide kind of things that Browne discusses. What might be reasons an organization would want to focus on the big picture? Why might they want to avoid it? What might be reasons an organization would want to focus on small issues? 3. What evidence does Browne gather? How do you like his presentation of it? 4. How would you best describe the "issue demands" that are observed in agricultural policy? 5. Browne takes his swipe at the so-called "coalition of groups" theories. Recall those coalitions seemed to be the hot new topic in aboud 1985 or 1990, and Browne wants to pooh-pooh them. So what? William Browne, ``Organized Interests, Grassroots Confidants, and Congress'' Chapter 13 in Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis,Interest Group Politics, 4th edition, (CQ Press, 1995), pp. 281-297. Photocopy I love this article. 1. Do you know the anecdote about AARP and long term health care in 1987? AARP lobbyists helped Congress write up a health care plan to add to medicare and they paid for it by taxing the richest senior citizens. The revolt among the rich AARP members members was huge and Congress repealed the plan one year later. Guess what members of Congress were supposed to learn from that? 2. Remember Schattschneider's point that, at least in theory, the impact of an interest group on elections should be muted, not overwhelming? Remember why? Does it foreshadow Browne's argument? 3. If a member of Congress wants to decide what he/she ought to do, how can he/she go about finding out? What role can a lobbyist play in this? 4. What evidence does Browne collect from the members of Congress? Whose input seems to count? 5. Do you feel more optimistic about the future of America in light of these findings? LB Chapter 6: Executive Branch 1. This is not emphasized as much in the reading as I would hope. But maybe you know, or can snoop around and find out. How do executive agencies "do" their work? At what stages of their work is "pressure" allowed, and what impact could it have? 2. We need to contrast lobbying of the Presidency against the rest of the bureaucracy. I think there is a big difference between asking for time with a White House staff member to talk about gun control than asking for time with the director of the ATF (Alcohol, Tobacco, and Fireams division of DOJ) to discuss a pending proposed rule. Right? What are the differences in avenues of access? 3. Contrast the "elitist", "capture", and "Chicago school" view of the role of executive agencies and businesses. 4. The "Congressional dominance" and "Executive dominance" views on the bureaucracy are widely discussed in political science. How you feel about these, for example, would likely have an influence on your choice of graduate school. Lets try to find out. 5. Discuss the methods of influence on the bureaucracy that LB outline. A. Indirect. B. Advisory Commissions C. Participation in rule making/adjudication. LB Chapter 7: Judiciary 1. How is lobbying the judiciary different from lobbying the legislature. Consider A. Standing B. Style C. Specialization 2. List anything useful you can find out about these influence strategies A. Influencing judicial selection B. Direct involvement in litigation 1. Businesses & their trade associations and citizen groups sue the bureaucracy 2. "class action" lawsuits 3. "test cases" nurtured by public interest law firms. C. Amicus Curiae brief. What is this? Why might it matter? Are Amicus briefs horribly influential? Why? 3. As old as the hills, and nearly as dearly, we hold the "have nots" thesis on use of the judiciary by interest groups. What is that "have nots" thesis and what are the challenges against it?