RWM Ch. 4 Campaigning

1. If you don't know the difference between 501c3 and 501c4 by
now, you better learn it from this chapter. Add to that the 527,
for which I owe you a section of the US Code.

2. "Issue advocacy" versus "independent expenditures".  I don't know
if the definitions in RWM are universally accepted, but we might as
well use them. Please make sure you understand the financial
regulations on these activities.

3. About Group endorsements: When are they most likely to have an
   impact on election outcomes?  

4. p 127 , "For a variety of reasons, hit lists are far less common
   than endorsements."  Lets see if we can't make a list of those
   reasons.

Skinner "527 Shadow Parties"

1. This article contrasts theories of parties.
   A. Aldrich's "rational choice" theory
   B. Responsible parties (refers to 1950s "Toward a more responsible
      party system" thesis of APSA)
   C. Party Networks

2. Why don't 527's have to follow the rules on campaign donation limits?

3. Does it make any difference if the same money that would have been
   given as "soft money" now flows into 527's?  How so?

4. There's some gibber about extremists and the Internet on p. 13. Lets
make sure we talk about that one.


LB Chapter 5

1. List the stages of the legislative process and explain
   A. how open to influence each stage is
   B. reasons why an organized interest might focus on that stage

2. Denzau-Munger "allocation of effort" model predicts that unorganized
   interests will get represented. Why? Explain "supply-price" of policy!

3. Donations don't matter!?

   A. Please study pp. 171-2. I believe there is a gross misstatement in the
   book p. 172, "More recently, however,..."  Take a look at the footnotes
   and see how "recent" those studies were.


   B.  Why is it so tough to prove that organized interests affect
   legislative decisions?

4. What do MC's (Members of Congress) want from lobbyists?  What
   do lobbyists have to give?

5. Let's make sure we all remember that bribery is illegal. And campaign
   donations can't have strings attached.  So why do organizations give
   at all?

6. What is this on p. 175: "Paradoxically, however, these are issues
   on which business interests actually have the least influence."
   Huh? Why? Always? ??




Godwin and Seldon, "What Corporations really want"


1. Describe the continuum between "purely private goods" and "purely
collective goods"

2. Refer to question 6 in the previous item. If I say "collective
action problem in business lobbying". What are you supposed to 
think?

3. Some political scientists (NOT Godwin and Seldon) emphasize
interest group coalitions.  They have some reasons why organizations might
pool their resources, or at least appear to. Guess how labor unions
overcome the collective action and act in concert through the AFL-CIO?
Guess how some businesses act in concert through the associations?
Just think. 

4.  Godwin and Seldon (p. 210) claim lobbyists are trying to maximize
their firm's profits and legislators are trying to get re-elected. I
agree with the last part, but have some issues about the first part. 

Recall the "new theory of the firm" 

The Principal agent problem:

    Principal wants agent to work hard

    Agent has expertise but cannot be monitored

    Process that creates outputs is "risky" or "uncertain", so
       principal agent cannot be sure if agent really tried or not.
   
    Agents are expected to "shirk" to some degree, and Principals
       want to design incentive contracts and steer agents toward
       monitor-able activities

What does this theory predict about what the bosses want the lobbyists
to do?

5. Please pay attention to the evidence that Godwin and Seldon
   discuss.  How is their evidence from the evidence that other
   studies used to reach opposite conclusions?

   I'd like to point out that that my advisor, Robert Salisbury,
   argued from his survey of lobbyists that most lobbyists spend the
   lion's share of their time monitoring politicians and other
   organizations, rather than trying to influence.

6. Did we start to clear up the question of why corporate PACs 
   give money? Really?


John Wright, "PACS, Contributions, and Roll Calls" APSR 1985


1. Before Wright's article was published, what was the 
state of our knowledge about the impact of PAC donations
on Congressional decisions?

2. Wright calls 2 theories of donations Type I and Type II.  
   What are the big differences between them?

3. How do PACs get people to pay?  If you want me to sound
   sophisticated, maybe I should instead ask What is the importance of
   the "federated structure" of organizations and PACS for the process
   of fundraising?

4.  Make a list of the variables that Wright uses in his model
    of campaign donations by PACs. What variables does he check, and
    which does he say are the most important?

5.  What do the results on roll call votes indicate?  What variables
    were investigated?    


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I'm starting blog6 with Hall & Wayman.